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A Biography on |
Born James Longstreet on January 8, 1821, at his grandparent’s plantation in the Edgefield District, South Carolina, Longstreet spent most of his youth outside Gainesville, Georgia. After his father died in 1833, his mother sent him to live with his uncle, Augustus Baldwin Longstreet, humorist, minister, and an ardent secessionist in 1860, while she relocated in Alabama. James received an appointment to West Point from Alabama (Georgia’s slots were filled) and entered the academy in 1838. His academic record was hardly impressive; he graduated fifty-fourth of sixty-two in the class of 1842.
With a brevet second lieutenant’s commission in hand, Longstreet served with the Fourth U.S. Infantry at Jefferson Barracks in Missouri and Louisiana. Transferring to the Eighth Infantry in 1845, he was stationed in Florida until the outbreak of the Mexican Was. From 1847 to 1849, Longstreet served as regimental adjutant and fought under Generals. Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott. Always brave and alert, Longstreet was wounded while charging the Mexican bastion at Chapultepec. His gallant behavior earned him brevets as captain on August 20 and major on September 8, 1847. After the war, Longstreet saw duty in Texas where he received a captain’s commission on December 7, 1852. On July 19, 1858, he was promoted to major in the Paymaster Department in Albuquerque, New Mexico Territory. Longstreet tendered his resignation from the U.S. Army on June 1, 1861
Longstreet (called “Old Pete” by his men) was made a brigadier general, dated June 17, and led a Virginia brigade near Manassas Junction. He did not see action at First Manassas on July 21, but he had been engaged three days earlier at Blackburn’s Ford where he repelled an advancing Federal brigade. The fight at Blackburn’s Ford demonstrated the superiority of the defense and probably influenced Longstreet’s tactical thinking for the rest of the war. He almost always preferred receiving the enemy’s assault and then striking back with a well-directed counterattack.
Longstreet often lacked finesse when dealing with his fellow
officers and civilian officials. Through he received a promotion
to major general, dated October 7, 1861, he risked his career
by supporting Gen. Joseph E. Johnston in his dispute with
Jefferson Davis over strategy and by blaming the president
for the army’s failure to capture Washington after Manassas.
His arrogant manner and strong opinions rankled subordinates
and superiors alike. Longstreet became moody and withdrawn
after he lost three of his four children to scarlet fever
in January 1862.
When Johnston shifted his forces to the peninsula in the spring
of 1862, Longstreet directed many of the complex movements
and handled responsibilities beyond his rank. During a rearguard
action at Williamsburg on May 5, Longstreet tenaciously held
his ground, allowing the bulk of Johnston’s force to
continue its retreat. He did not, however, enjoy success at
Seven Pines on May 31. Johnston’s confusing orders resulted
in an argument between Longstreet and Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger,
which delayed the Confederate advance. Longstreet made matters
worse by swinging his troops farther south than Johnston had
intended, but he redeemed himself by aggressively fulfilling
his orders during the Seven Days campaign (June 25-July 1).
Longstreet especially impressed his new commander, Gen. Robert
E. Lee, who told Davis the “Longstreet is a Capital
soldier.”
When Lee reorganized the Army of Northern Virginia after the Seven Days’ Battles, he gave Longstreet the right wing, which included five divisions, while giving Maj. Gen. Thomas J. (“Stonewall”) Jackson only three. At Second Manassas Longstreet arrived on the field on August 29, just to the right of Jackson. Although urged by Lee to launch an attack immediately, Longstreet warned that a premature assault would not allow him to concentrate his forces. Lee acquiesced, permitting Longstreet to bring his entire command to bear on the enemy the next day, when he drove the Federals off in confusion.
Longstreet further enhanced his reputation at Sharpsburg,
Maryland, on September 17. Conspicuously wearing a pair of
carpet slippers because of a foot injury, Longstreet was omnipresent,
encouraging his men and even holding his staff officers’
horses so they could operate the cannon of a depleted battery.
One of his subordinates remembered that Longstreet was “like
a rock in steadiness when sometimes in battle the world seemed
flying to pieces.” Throughout the day he brilliantly
shifted his troops to meet each Union threat. When Longstreet
returned to headquarters that night, Lee embraced him and
exclaimed, “Ah! Here is Longstreet; here is my old war-horse”
(which led to Longstreet’s being called “Lee’s
War Horse” on occasion). Lee pushed for Longstreet’s
promotion to lieutenant general, which was approved, dated
October 9. With the boost in rank, he also received command
of the First Corps.
The Battle of Fredericksburg on December 13, 1862, must have
confirmed Longstreet’s faith in superiority of the defense.
In repulsing over 25,000 Federals at Marye’s Heights,
he not only took advantage of the natural terrain but improved
it with entrenchments. Longstreet, in fact, deserves credit
as one of the first officers to demonstrate the decisive advantage
in constructing fieldworks. During the winter, he ordered
the use of traverse—earthen walls that cut across a
trench and protected the flanks of the men inside.
Unable to feed his army adequately at the beginning of 1863, Lee dispatched Longstreet with two divisions of the First Corps to the area south of the James River. Although he furnished his troops with sufficient supplies, Longstreet cautiously besieged Suffolk and decided against a major assault. Controversy surrounded Longstreet’s decision, since he himself had admitted that the place could be captured. Some detractors point to this failure as proof that he was not aggressive. A British observer, however, wrote that Longstreet “was never far from General Lee, who relies very much upon his judgment. By the soldiers he is invariably spoken of as ‘the best fighter in the whole army.’” Because Longstreet was on detached service, he missed the Battle of Chancellorsville but marched with the army into Pennsylvania.
Longstreet and Lee collided over strategy during the Gettysburg campaign. Longstreet had favored a concentration of forces in the West, but Lee insisted on a raid into the North. Longstreet felt comfortable with his superior’s plan as long as Lee would retire to a strong defensive position and force the Federals to assault the Army of Northern Virginia. When Lee decided to attack the Northern position south of Gettysburg on July 2, Longstreet felt betrayed. Lee, in fact, rejected Longstreet’s suggestion to flank the Union left that day, instructing his subordinate to press straight ahead. Unusually apathetic and sluggish in his movements, Longstreet nevertheless launched a fierce assault through the Peach Orchard and Wheat Field, which nearly captured Little Round Top.
Lee continued his frontal assaults the next day against Cemetery
Hill. Longstreet adamantly opposed such a move, desiring a
flanking maneuver instead. Lee held firm, however, and ordered
Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett’s division and elements
of the Third Corps to strike the Union center. Before the
attack, Longstreet told artillerist Col. Edward Porter Alexander
“I do not want to make this charge. I do not see how
it can succeed.” Alexander thought Longstreet “Obeyed
reluctantly at Gettysburg, on the 2nd and 3rd. But it must
be admitted that his judgment in both matters was sound and
he owed it to Lee to be reluctant, for failure was inevitable.”
After the battle, Longstreet privately expressed the hope
that all of Lee’s subordinates would share responsibility
for the army’s defeat and that Lee would still enjoy
the South’s full support.
Longstreet and two of his divisions were detached to the Army
of Tennessee after Gettysburg, a plan consistent with Longstreet’s
strategic view that emphasized a concentration of Confederate
forces in the western theater. At Chickamauga on September
20, 1863, Longstreet exploited a gap in the enemy’s
line, routing the entire Union army, an accomplishment that
earned him a new nickname—“Bull of the Woods.”
He followed this triumph with a poor showing during the siege
of Chattanooga when he allowed the Federals to gain a foothold
at the base of Lookout Mountain at the end of October.
Longstreet also became embroiled in the feud that surrounding General Braxton Bragg that fall. Longstreet fueled divisiveness among the officers in the Army of Tennessee by openly criticizing Bragg. Rumors surfaced that Longstreet would replace Bragg as the army’s new commander, but Jefferson Davis suggested that Longstreet receive an independent command and move toward Knoxville, which he did on November 5. A few weeks later the mission ended in failure, marking the nadir of Longstreet’s career as he feuded with his subordinates, notably Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, while his men suffered from a lack of rations and clothing.
Longstreet and his two divisions returned to Virginia in April 1864, a welcome addition to the Army of Northern Virginia. One of Lee’s staff officers wrote to Longstreet: “I really am beside myself, General, with joy of having you back. It is like the reunion of a family.”
Longstreet recaptured his former glory at the Battle of the Wilderness on May 6 by completing a forced march and then directing a counterattack that saved the Confederate right flank. In circumstances remarkable similar to the wounding of Stonewall Jackson the previous year, Longstreet’s own men fired at the general and his staff, hitting the First Corps commander in the throat and right arm—a serious injury that required an extended period of absence. Because his officer corps had been thinned, Lee desperately needed the services of his lieutenant for the rest of the Overland campaign and beginning the siege of Petersburg. One Confederate staff officer felt “very anxious that General Longstreet should get back to the army…. General Lee needs him not only to advise with, but General Longstreet has a very suggestive mind and none of the other Lt. Generals have this.”
With a husky voice and a paralyzed arm, Longstreet returned to the First Corps in October. The general’s condition presented Lee with a perfect opportunity to reassign his subordinate to a less critical post, but Lee immediately gave Longstreet command of the army’s left flank, a line that stretched north of the James River. After the Federals broke through the Petersburg defenses on April 2, 1865, Longstreet guided his own troops as well as remnants of the Third Corps during the retreat to Appomattox. When a fellow officer suggested that Longstreet impress upon Lee the need to surrender, Longstreet strongly rebuked him, saying that only Lee could make that decision and that he would follow the general to the end.
Longstreet’s reputation declined precipitously after the war, largely owing to the efforts of a cadre of Southern officers headed by Jubal Early. Through the Southern Historical Society Papers, these men blamed Longstreet for the loss at Gettysburg and characterized him as a sulky, insubordinate officer who consistently undermined Lee’s operations. Longstreet’s published criticism of Lee’s actions at Gettysburg in the Philadelphia Weekly Times of November 3, 1877, and February 28, 1878, and his affiliation with the Republican party after the war made him a convenient scapegoat for the South’s defeat. Edward Porter Alexander, who had been at Gettysburg, noted that “Longstreet’s great mistake was not in the war, but in some of his awkward and apparently bitter criticisms of Gen. Lee.” The negative sentiments held against Longstreet are reflected in an 1876 letter written by Early: “He (Longstreet) is sincerely purporting to lay claim to the chief glory for the seven days around Richmond, but the rebut I gave him on that head has taken the wind out of his sails.”
Nevertheless, although Longstreet did not always agree with Lee’s decisions, they maintained a warm relationship and respected each other professionally. Lee frequently camped next to Longstreet, and a British observer noted in 1863 that the friendship between the two officers was “quite touching—they are almost always together.” Longstreet exhibited shortcomings as an independent commander and lacked delicacy in dealing with subordinates. In combat, however, he had few equals. Unlike Stonewall Jackson who frequently attacked in a piecemeal fashion, Longstreet delivered well-coordinated assaults by concentrating his forces against a specific point.
Pardoned on June 19, 1867, Longstreet, through connections with the Republican party, obtained a number of governmental appointments, including surveyor of the port of New Orleans in 1869; postmaster at Gainesville, Georgia, in 1879; U.S. Minister to Turkey in 1880; and Federal marshal for northern Georgia in 1881. President William McKinley appointed him U.S. Commissioner of the railroads in 1897. Longstreet spent the remaining years of his life near Gainesville where he died on January 2, 1904.