| Dawn attack on the 2nd Day at Gettysburg |
Throughout popular history, it has been said that General Longstreet was ordered by General Lee to make a dawn attack at Gettysburg on the 2nd of July 1863. This first appears in the Southern Historical Society Papers and in many circles continues today by the critics of General Longstreet.
As was stated several times during the publishing of the Southern Historical Society Papers (SHSP) General Longstreet was to attack at dawn on the 2nd of July 1863. This accusation was made by General Pendleton (the first to make this accusation) and Jubal Early (Editor of the SHSP), along with several others. To examine this issue one must first view the Official Records of the War of Rebellion. In these records you can find that the dawn attack was mentioned as a possibility by Generals Ewell and Early. In these reports they stated that Confederate forces were moving to Gettysburg in mass and an early morning attack was expected.(1) In General Ewell’s report it goes further to say that about 4 am. On the morning of the second he received word from the commanding general that the attack would begin when General Longstreet’s artillery opened fire later in the day. In General Early’s report he stated that the early morning attack anticipated did not start and in the morning he was informed that the attack would begin at 4 pm. (2)
Looking at these reports (the only ones that even mentioned a early morning attack) one must think that an attack was planned but if one would look closer, at no time do these reports show that an early morning attack was to begin based on General Longstreet’s Corps. At midnight of the 2nd, the 1st Corps was at its closest point 4 miles from the battlefield where they rested for the night. According to Lieutenant Colonel Fremantle he rose of the morning of the 2nd at 3:30 am for breakfast and at 7 am he witnessed General Longstreet placing his first elements of General McLaws’ division in place. This would have only allowed for 3 ½ hours of sleep for Hood’s men who arrived near Cashtown at midnight on the 2nd. General. (3) McLaws’ men arrived near this point at 2 PM on the 1st but could not advance due to A.P. Hill’s men on the road.
Critics of General Longstreet ask why General Longstreet did not move General McLaws’ men during the night since they were only 4 miles from the field of battle. This question has an easy answer. According to General A.P. Hill’s official report, on the evening of the 1st the road was blocked some 2 miles from Gettysburg by General Anderson’s Division of A.P. Hill’s Corps.(4) Until this Corps was moved into place General Longstreet was unable to move his men forward. General Hill further in his report stated he did not move General Anderson’s Division into place until the morning of the 2nd,(4) thus freeing the road for Longstreet to advance his men.
Thinking of this, one must ask, when did General Lee make the final determination of his point of attack for the 2nd of July. Early on, General Lee had determined that Longstreet needed to attack on the Union left but the specific point was not yet determined until General Pendleton had finished his reconnaissance after sunrise on the morning of the 2nd. In General Pendleton’s Official Report it says “…soon after sunrise, I surveyed the enemy's position toward some estimate of the ground and the best mode of attack. So far as judgment could be formed from such a view, assault on the enemy's left by our extreme right might succeed, should the mountain there of the no insuperable obstacle. To attack on that side, if practicable, I understood to be the purpose of the commanding general.”(5) With the reconnaissance not completed until after dawn one must now ask how could General Longstreet have his men in place for a dawn attack on the 2nd.
Surmising from this information there could have been a desire for a morning attack but one must account for all of the facts stated and can only determine a early morning attack could not have occurred due to troop movement times required and that fact the specific point of attack was not determined until some time after dawn on the 2nd by General Pendleton.
If this is not enough evidence to convince the still skeptical, one can also look at several letters written to General Longstreet in response to his request asking members of General Lee’s Staff if General Lee ever ordered him to make a dawn attack on the morning of the 2nd. One of the staff members responding General Longstreet’s question concerning the dawn attack was Colonel Walter H. Taylor who in 1876 became one of the chief proponent supporting the accusation that Longstreet disobeyed General Lee’s dawn attack order. His letter was sent from Norfolk Virginia and was dated April 28, 1875 and said “I can only say that I never before heard of ‘the sunrise attack’ you were to have made as charged by General Pendleton.”(6)
On May 7, 1875 General Longstreet received a reply from Colonel Charles Marshall that said “I have no personal recollection of the order to which you refer. It certainly was not conveyed by me, nor is there anything in General Lee’s official report to show the attack on the 2nd was expected by him to begin earlier, except that he notices that there was not proper concert of action on that day.”(7)
In a letter from Colonel Charles Venable dated May 11, 1875 he says, “I did not know of any order for an attack on the enemy at sunrise on the 2d, nor can I believe any such order was issued by General Lee. About sunrise on the 2d of July I was sent by General Lee to General Ewell to ask him what he thought of the advantages of an attack on the enemy from his position. General Ewell made me ride with him from point to point of his lines, so as to see with him the exact position of things. Before he got through the examination of the enemy’s position General Lee came himself to General Ewell’s lines. In sending the message to General Ewell, General Lee was explicit in saying that the question was whether he should move all the troops around on the right and attack on that side.”(8)
The last letter General Longstreet received was from General A. A. Long. This letter was sent from Big Island, Bedford, Virginia dated May 31, 1875. In this letter, General Long states “I do not recollect of hearing of an order to attack at sunrise, or at any other designated hour, pending the operations at Gettysburg during the first three days of July, 1863.” General Long, at the time of the battle of Gettysburg was General Lee’s military secretary.(9)
With this said one still must wonder why prominent members of the Army of Northern Virginia would strike out against one of their own comrades in arms. There are several possibilities such as General Longstreet changing to the Republican party of Lincoln after the war. Or that he was in charge of the troops that up held the law in New Orleans. But one point noted is that, General Longstreet never disobeyed the order for a dawn attack on the 2nd of July 1863. In their own reports and letters they actually supported General Longstreet that no order was given for a dawn attack on July 2nd, 1863.
Bibliography
1. Official Record, War of Rebellion, Series 1, Volume 27, Part 2, , Chapter 39, page 446
2. Official Record, War of Rebellion, Series 1, Volume 27, Part 2, , Chapter 39, page 470
3. Three Months in the Southern States by Lt. Col. Arthur Fremantle, pages 257 & 258
4. Official Record, War of Rebellion, Series 1, Volume 27, Part 2, , Chapter 39, page 607
5. Official Record, War of Rebellion, Series 1, Volume 27, Part 2, , Chapter 39, page 450
6. Lee and Longstreet at High Tide: Gettysburg in the Light of the Official Records, Page 58
7. Lee and Longstreet at High Tide: Gettysburg in the Light of the Official Records, Page 59
8. Lee and Longstreet at High Tide: Gettysburg in the Light of the Official Records, Page 59 & 60
9.Lee and Longstreet at High Tide: Gettysburg in the Light of the Official Records, Page 60